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Introduction
An increasing number of empirical studies (e.g. Mauro 1995 , Knack and Keefer 1995 , Knack 1996 , Keefer and Knack 1997 , Mo 2001 , Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004 present persuasive evidence regarding the detrimental effects of corruption on various economic variables such as the growth rate of income.
Corruption does not only affect the growth rate of income but also affects income inequality and poverty. "The benefits from corruption are likely to accrue to the better connected individuals … who belong mostly to high income groups" (Gupta et. al. 2002, 23) . According to Jonston (1989) , corruption favors the 'haves' rather than the 'have nots' particularly if the stakes are large. The burden of corruption falls disproportionately on low income individuals. Individuals who belong to low income groups pay a higher proportion of their income than the individuals who belong to high income groups. As Tanzi (1998) argues, corruption distorts the redistributive role of government. Since only the better connected individuals get the most profitable government projects, it is less likely that the government is able to improve the distribution of income and make the economic system more equitable. It diverts government spending away from projects that benefit mostly low income individuals such as education and health to, for example, defense projects that create opportunities for corruption (Chetwyn et al. 2003) .
Nevertheless, there are only a few empirical studies (Li, Xu, and Zou 2000 , Gupta et. al. 2002 , and Chong and Calderon 2000a and 2000b analyzing the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Using data from a mixed group of countries, i.e., low, middle, and high-income, Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) and Chong and Calderon (2000a) find an inverse U-shaped relationship between corruption and income inequality. They find a positive relationship between corruption and income inequality in high-income countries and a negative relationship in low-income countries. Gupta et al. (2002) , on the other hand, using a smaller sample of countries, find a positive and linear relationship between corruption and income inequality. Chong and Calderon (2000b) and Gupta et al. (2002) both analyze the effects of corruption on poverty as well as on income inequality. As Chong and Calderon (2000b) argue, an increase in income inequality as corruption increases does not necessarily mean that poverty also increases. If, for example, the incomes in the higher end of the distribution grow faster than incomes in the lower end of the distribution, income inequality increases while poverty decreases. Both Chong and Calderon (2000b) and Gupta et al. (2002) find a positive and linear relationship between corruption and poverty.
In this study, we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty by using data from U.S. states. Using data from U.S. states is quite advantageous.
The likelihood of the problems arising due to data incomparability is minimal. Data on corruption as well as on income inequality and poverty for U.S. states are more comparable than those for different countries, and U.S. states are more similar in other dimensions that are difficult to measure. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality and poverty across U.S. states.
Our analysis advances the existing literature in three ways. First, instead of using subjective cross-country corruption indices assembled by various investment risk services, we use an objective measure of corruption: the number of government officials 5 convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption. Second, we employ all commonly used inequality and poverty measures including various Atkinson indexes, Gini index, standard deviation of the logarithms, relative mean deviation, coefficient of variation, and the poverty rate defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. Finally, we exploit both time series and cross-sectional variation in the data.
Data
We use annual data from 50 states for 17 years, from 1981 to 1997. For our measure of corruption (Corruption), we use the number of government officials convicted in a state for crimes related to corruption in a year. The data are from the Justice Department's "Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section". These data are used by several studies such as Goel and Rich (1989) , Fisman and Gatti (2002) , Fredriksson, List and Millimet (2003) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) to measure corruption across states. They cover a broad range of crimes from election fraud to wire fraud. We deflate the number of convictions by state population.
As Glaeser and Saks (2006) argue, using the number of convictions creates a problem since a smaller number of government officials are likely to be convicted in corrupt states. Following Glaeser and Saks (2006) , to mitigate this problem, we focus on federal convictions.
We measure income inequality across states by using the four traditional measures Gini Index (Gini), standard deviation of the logarithms (SDL), relative mean deviation (RMD), and the coefficient of variation (CV) as well as the various Atkinson 6 indexes (I ε ) given by Wu, Golan, and Perloff (2006) 
Atkinson index (I) is an inequality measure which is based on the concept of what Atkinson (1970) calls the equally distributed equivalent level of income. 3 It is
We wish to thank Ximing Wu, Jeffrey M. Perloff, and Amos Golan for making their data publicly available. where, ε measures the degree of inequality aversion. It takes values ranging from 0 to . ∞ As ε increases the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution and as ε decreases it becomes more sensitive to changes at the higher end of the distribution. The index equals zero when distribution of income is equal and approaches 1 as inequality increases. We assume ε is equal to 0.5, 1, and 1.5. 4
We measure poverty by the percentage of people whose income is under the poverty threshold given by the Census Bureau. In order to determine the number of people who are in poverty, the Census Bureau uses a set of income thresholds that vary by the size and the composition of the family. If a family's total income is less than the family's threshold, then every person belonging to that family is considered in poverty. The poverty thresholds are updated using the consumer price index.
Based on the averages across the 17 years, Texas has the highest inequality regardless of which inequality measure is used while Mississippi has the highest poverty.
Vermont has the lowest inequality when SDL is used to measure inequality while Wisconsin has the lowest inequality when other measures are used. New Hampshire has the lowest poverty. Mississippi and Vermont are the most and the least corrupt states, respectively. The states with the three lowest and highest inequality and poverty as well those with the three lowest and highest corruption are given in Table 1 . The summary statistics for all of the inequality measures, poverty, and corruption are given in Table 2 .
As expected, the correlations between the inequality measures, poverty, and corruption are positive: the correlation coefficients between corruption and the inequality measures are around 0.20 as is the correlation coefficient between corruption and 8 poverty. Pairwise correlations of the inequality measures, poverty, and corruption are given in Table 3 .
We include a set of control variables in our regressions to minimize the omitted variable bias. First, following Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006) , we include a set of government policy variables: earned income tax credit benefit rate (EITCB), earned income tax credit phase-out rate (EITCP), and aid to the families with dependent children/temporary assistance to needy families (AFDC/TANF). The AFDC/TANF is the maximum monthly benefits for a single parent, three person family. EITCB is the product of the earned income tax credit rate and the maximum income required for maximum benefit. The earned income tax credit is phased out as a family's income rises. EITCP is the rate at which the earned income tax credit benefit is reduced over the phase-out range.
The data are from Wu, Perloff, and Golan (2006) . Second, we include two macroeconomic variables: real per capita personal income (Income) and the unemployment rate (Unemployment). The income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the unemployment data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
As Glaeser (2005) argues, stronger unions generally mean increased equality. Hence we include the unionization rate (Union) as another control variable using the estimates provided by Hirsch, Macpherson, and Vroman (2001) . Finally, we include education (Education) as our last control variable. We measure education as the share of secondary school enrolment in the population. The data are from National Center for Education Statistics. 9
Results

Corruption and income inequality
To analyze the relationship between corruption and income inequality, we estimate the following basic model by ordinary least squares (OLS) controlling for time and region fixed effects: Table 4 . The R 2 ranges from 0.46 to 0.64. In all regressions, the estimated coefficient of corruption is positive and highly significant indicating that corruption increases income inequality. One standard deviation increase in Corruption increases
Gini, for example, by 0.3 percentage points, the same increase in Gini due to a 20 percent decrease in AFDC/TANF. Up to 6 percent of the difference in Gini index between the least corrupt state Vermont and the most corrupt state Mississippi is explained by different corruption levels in those states. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in Corruption increases SDL by 0.6 percentage points, RMD by 0.5 percentage points, and CV by 1.4 percentage points.
As mentioned earlier, as ε increases, the Atkinson index becomes more sensitive to changes at the lower end of the income distribution. The estimated coefficient of Corruption increases as ε increases, indicating that effects of corruption on the lower end of the distribution are higher. One standard deviation increase in Corruption increases I ε =0.5, I ε =1, and I ε =1.5, by 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 percentage points, respectively.
Our results about the effects of macroeconomic and demographic control variables on income inequality are mostly consistent with the earlier studies. The estimated coefficients of Unemployment, Income, Education, and Union are significant in all estimations. We find that education and unionization have an equalizing effect while unemployment rate tends to increase income inequality as expected (Li et. al. 2000 , Gupta et. al. 2002 , Glaeser 2005 , Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2006 . According to our estimations, an increase in real per capita income increases income inequality. Regarding the government policy variables, the estimated coefficients of EITCB, EITCP, AFDC/TANF are significant in all estimations. Again, as expected, while the estimated coefficient of EITCP is positive, the estimated coefficients of both EITCB and AFDC/TANF are negative (Wu, Perloff, and Golan 2006) .
Corruption and poverty
In our poverty regressions we control for Income, Education, Unemployment,
region and year dummies, as well as inequality (Gini, SDL, RMD, CV, AI). The results of the OLS estimation are given in Table 5 . 5 We first estimate a poverty regression without controlling for inequality. The R 2 is 0.67. The estimated coefficient of corruption is positive and significant indicating that corruption increases poverty. One standard deviation increase in Corruption increases Poverty by 0.5 percentage points, the same increase in Poverty due to a 10 percent increase in Unemployment. Up to 7 percent of the difference in Poverty between Vermont and Mississippi is explained by different corruption levels in those states. According to Ravallion (1997) , income inequality matters for poverty reduction. It is then quite likely that corruption affect poverty both directly and indirectly through income inequality. In our regressions the coefficient of the income inequality regardless of the measure we use is positive and highly significant which is consistent with Chong and Calderon (2000b 
Robustness of the Results
The main robustness issue is whether the results are due to reverse causality. As You and Khagram (2005) , Uslaner (2006) , and Chong and Gradstein (2007) Table 6 , and for the poverty regressions in Table 7 . The estimated coefficient of corruption is positive and highly significant in all regressions indicating that our results are robust to reverse causality. As long as the ethnic and religious fractionalization indexes affect income inequality and poverty through
Corruption, the instruments are theoretically valid. According to the 1 st stage F and the Hansen J statistics given in Table 6 and Table 7 , they are empirically valid as well.
The second robustness issue is the possible measurement error in Corruption.
Nevertheless, IV estimation does not only help correct for reverse causality but also the measurement error.
The third robustness issue is the presence of spatial autocorrelation. Income inequality and poverty in a state is likely to be affected by income inequality and poverty in neighboring states. Ignoring spatial autocorrelation in income inequality and poverty causes biased estimates. To control for spatial autocorrelation, we estimate the following spatial autoregressive (i.e., spatial lag) model by maximum likelihood (ML): 
Conclusion
Corruption is not a phenomenon peculiar to low-income countries. It is possible to find examples of corruption in high-income countries as well. In Germany, for example, corruption led to an increase in cost of about 20 to 30 percent during the construction of terminal 2 at Frankfort Airport. In Italy, the cost of major construction projects fell significantly in the aftermath of corruption investigations in the early 1990s (Rose- (Wallis, Fishback, and Kantor 2006) .
In this study, we analyze the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty by using data from U.S. states. To our knowledge, this is in fact the first study using data from U.S. states. Where previous analyses relied on cross-sectional variation in cross-country data, our analysis is less sensitive to bias due to unobserved countryspecific heterogeneity. Of course, data on our variables of interest -corruption, income inequality and poverty -as well as on control variables such as AFDC/TANF, are more comparable across U.S. states than those across different countries. We find robust evidence that an increase in corruption increases income inequality and poverty. One standard deviation increase in corruption increases Gini index by 0.3 percentage points, the standard deviation of the logarithms by 0.6 percentage points, the relative mean deviation by 0.5 percentage points, the coefficient of variation by 1.4 percentage points, and poverty by 0.5 percentage points.
Using Atkinson indexes with different degrees of inequality aversion helps us see
if the effects of corruption on the lower end of the distribution differ from the effects on the higher end. We find that the coefficient estimate of corruption increases as the degree 16 of inequality aversion increases, indicating that effects of corruption on the lower end of the distribution are higher. One standard deviation increase in corruption increases the Atkinson indexes by 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6 percentage points for the degrees of inequality aversion 0.5, 1, and 1.5, respectively. 
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